🚀 go-pugleaf

jmfbahciv <See....@aol.com> writes:
>Scott Lurndal wrote:
>> jmfbahciv <See....@aol.com> writes:
>>>Quadibloc wrote:
>>>> On some tech news site, I came across a comment to the effect that things
>>>like
>>>> Meltdown and Spectre wouldn't be such a big deal...
>>>>
>>>> if the only executable content our computers ran were programs we
>installed
>>>on
>>>> them.
>>>>
>>>> Of course, that wouldn't prevent viruses 100%, but it would return things
>>>back to
>>>> the situation that existed before the Internet.
>>>>
>>>> So when viewing a web site, the server would have to do all the work of
>any
>>>fancy
>>>> programmed behavior of the site. The computer would act like it was just a
>>>TV set
>>>> for viewing the site.
>>>>
>>>> I think that this suggestion is a little too extreme. After all, millions
>of
>>>> people might be viewing a site on a tiny little server. So the computers
>of
>>>> people viewing web sites have to be expected to do some of the work.
>>>>
>>>> But given that fixes for Meltdown and Spectre will apparently make
>computers
>>>> slower, this inspired me to think of a way that this idea could be
>modified
>>>to
>>>> be usable.
>>>>
>>>> Maybe every computer that views the Internet, to be secure, needs to be
>two
>>>> computers.
>>>>
>>>> One conventional computer that's fast, and has, as a result, imperfect
>>>security,
>>>> that one uses to run one's own programs.
>>>>
>>>> And a second very secure and somewhat slow computer. When viewing web
>sites,
>>>or
>>>> opening word processor documents with macros, and so on, in order to
>>>properly
>>>> sandbox this foreign executable content, it gets run on the slow computer.
>>>>
>>>> The slow computer's supervisory program runs in memory that looks like ROM
>>>to
>>>> it, but which is writeable by the fast computer - and only the fast
>computer
>>>can
>>>> access the hard drive. The slow computer would be slow because it wouldn't
>>>do
>>>> dangerous things like speculation; if necessary, it might not even be
>>>pipelined.
>>>>
>>>> Outputs from the slow computer would be processed by the fast computer to
>>>> display them to the user; so the fast computer would still have to have
>bug
>>>free
>>>> programs without vulnerabilities to display web sites, display video and
>>>images,
>>>> and so on. So it would not be a panacea for security, it would simply deal
>>>with
>>>> the most uncontrollable class of vulnerabilities. The fast computer would
>>>still
>>>> need security measures to prevent things like buffer overflows.
>>>
>>>Doesn't a personal router provide the slow computer's functionality?
>>>
>>
>> No, it's a specialized device for packet forwarding.
>>
>> ARM has an architecture called BigLittle, where a multiprocessor
>> die consists of several high-end (e.g. out of order, high power, high
>frequency)
>> cores (e.g. A57 or A75) and one or two smaller, low-power, in-order
>> cores).   The operating software can direct tasks to the appropriate
>> type of core and can power off the high-power cores when not necessary.
>
>that doesn't prevent "bad bits" from occupying the machine. 


Why would you say that?   What possible knowlege of
the ARM solution do you have other than the very limited
description above?  Don't you think very smart people have
considered the security aspects of the design, specifically
in light of modern threat scenarios?